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Such care hasn't always been taken, however, and there may be a rush to judg ment. When you tell the story of decline in English, for example, you might decide that the blame rests primarily with Derrida, Foucault, and the other apostles of "Theory." I must confess that I've made that argument myself and I'm still con vinced by it. But, then again, the rise of Theory might have been a reaction to a collapse that was already underway?less an expression of hubris than a "Hail Mary"
pass. Indeed, without the strategem of Theory, the decline might even have been worse than it was. Or, just possibly, Derrida and company had no significant effect at all. The real stab in our backs might have come from the explosion of new media, or from a globalizing economy that heightened tensions felt most directly by the young.
Even with the chance to explore the Copula and the mysteries of Power/Knowl edge, fewer undergraduates might have chosen English if they thought they'd spend the rest of their lives waiting tables.
We don't know enough about what happened, and maybe we never will. It's important to recognize, however, that the sheer fact of decline offers a tempting occasion for anyone eager to settle old scores or advance new schemes. But, just as we can't say, "This caused that," with a high degree of precision, there's always a bit of a bluff in declaring, "This is guaranteed to fix it."
Educations End is a good example. It's not concerned with declining enroll ments or the loss of faculty positions. But the book's appearance at a moment of great consternation lends its argument a force that it might otherwise lack. Education s End is a lineal descendant of Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind. In fact, its roots go back even farther, to the elitist humanism of Irving Babbitt. It makes much the same argument that Bloom did and it has the same basic loyalties, but it does rather furtively what Bloom did in plain view. Bloom was brilliant enough, and suave enough, to put everything (almost) right out there?his contempt for the six ties and for popular culture, his Leo Straussian dislike of the Left, his University-of Chicago neoclassicism. Kronman doesn't pack ammunition of that caliber. Instead, he asks questions and gives answers that are so free from complication that, in our present crisis, they might just take on a high degree of salience. And that would be a great shame.
"Whatever happened," this book asks, "to the Meaning of Life? Why has higher education turned its back on the Big Issues that once formed the core of the hu In other words, don't even think of stepping outside the Great Conversation. It's
"free and open," but it "insists" and "demands." The Meaning of Life may be per sonal, but if you imagine that you have the right to create a conversation of your own, you stand exposed as morally defective. Is this really better than the Political Correctness that Kronman claims to deplore? Please notice also one other detail.
His "conversation" prohibits not only any effort to leave the room but also any hope of bringing outsiders in. It is, as Kronman says, the "conversation of the West." If the ancient Jews had thought this way, they never would have put into their Bible the Sumerian myths of Eden and the Flood, or the idea, borrowed from the Per sians, of a cosmic struggle between Good and Evil. The Greeks would never have become obsessed with geometry, first invented by the Egyptians. The Romans would never have adopted the Christian faith, nor would the French, the Poles, the En glish, or anyone else. To have done so would have been "the illusion of freedom" and a betrayal of their patrimonial "inheritance."
What we get here is the standard Great Books party line. Like his predecessors, Kronman presupposes that just reading those monuments of unaging intellect makes you a better human being. But this claim is just as much a superstition as the belief that rubbing the fur of a black cat makes your warts go away. People who are well versed in the Greeks, the Bible, Shakespeare, and the rest have proven themselves name you kept forgetting, ended with advice that turned your mind around 180 degrees. He seemed to say that the point wasn't to take off the mask at all, but to feel the "fire" burning behind it.
For reasons you never stopped to explore, you signed up for some very strange courses for the next semester. Throughout the spring, you spent three hours weekly discussing Socrates's injunction "Know thyself." (Yes, Plato is worth reading.) And then, that same semester, you worked your way through The Awakening and a chap ter from a book called The Interpretation of Dreams, which was like looking at your own mind from the outside.
The semester after that, you read V. inquisitors. He also places blame on professional specialization, which does indeed deserve a critical rethinking. But, on this subject, as on others in the book, the rhetoric of simplification works to obscure much that could be learned. When the humani ties first started to pattern themselves on the sciences and technical professions, they didn't surrender moral authority, as Kronman alleges. In the era of profession alism, the nature of moral authority changed, and the humanities changed in re sponse. The aftermath had its pluses and minuses, its costs as well as its opportuni ties. Educations End, however, is not the place where those distinctions get weighed out.
Bad as specialization seems, it turns out to be the least of the bogeys that Kronman warns against. Even more frightening are the other two: fundamentalist religion and science. Kronman writes with loving nostalgia for the faith-based edu cation of the nineteenth century, and he lards some pages so heavily with the word "God" that you have to think he's some kind of believer. But, intellectually, Kronman describes himself as an advocate of "secular humanism," which he understands as replacing God with tradition. From this standpoint, he sounds a clarion against the growing power of fundamentalism. Our only hope, he warns, is to stop fighting among ourselves and rally round the Great Books, much as enemies abroad induce our President to constrict debate here at home. for including religion in the humanities. How can we make sense of our current world without it? Indeed, some understanding of the inner lives of Moslems seems to me more urgent and enlightening than an acquaintance with The Symposium. In an age when our imperial aspirations have put the survival of whole nations at risk, young Americans would be far better served by reading Gandhi than by going back to Machiavelli. Thoughtful people wrote words like these in the 1950s. Their aim was to establish the same division of labor that Kronman proposes, but it ultimately proved unsus tainable. The humanities were supposed to remind us of our limits as mortals and provide an inner check on the quest of science for greater and greater control over the world. But when travelers use a time machine, they miss the opportunity to learn from events, such the failure of the humanities to market themselves in this way.
Assuming that people really feel the emptiness that Kronman describes, it surely preceded science. Wasn't Fear and Trembling on the reading list? It seems to me more likely that science was a response to this emptiness, not the cause. Indeed, our intimations of emptiness may be the well from which all of our creativity springs.
Long before we had the technology to put men and women into space, our restless minds were already dreaming of a journey to the stars. Maybe there, we hoped with out much conviction, the emptiness would go away.
The wall between the humanities and science failed for another reason. "I couldn't understand it," she told me later, "but then again, I'm not that smart when it comes to these ideas."
It turned out that my friend was not the only one who didn't feel smart enough.
As far as I could ascertain, many in the audience were baffled. During the question and-answer period, a number of students had asked the distinguished professor why she chose not to communicate in a way that was more accessible to ordinary people.
Basically, she made it clear to them that she was an Intellectual. It was the job of the audience to reach up.
From a pragmatic standpoint, there's something stunningly unintelligent about delivering a public talk that the public can't understand. I know, I know, the speaker was subverting the standard categories and forcing her listeners to confront the interpellations of ideology. But in this case, it just didn't work, did it? Language that can't be understood has no transformative power. It's noise. Over the last twenty years, such noisy events have happened all the time, not only in public but also in print. They make the simplicity of Kronman's book all the more enticing. Between Kronman and our postcolonial diva, we truly face a Hobson's choice.
Both paths entail a massive failure of imagination at a time when we need imagina tion more than ever.
In that spirit, we might give some thought to a range of other alternatives. For example, the humanities could play a greater role in sustaining a vital culture of the arts, which they pushed to the margins in the heyday of Theory. The arts exist primarily to demonstrate ways of making the world more coherent: they showcase modes of experience that enlarge our ability to see, to act, to know, to feel, and to share. I recognize that this idea of the arts gives offense to many, but the problem isn't with arts themselves?it lies with our past pretensions about them. Once we jettison the genius in his or her studio, to say nothing of the antiquated wreckage of aesthetics, we can see the arts for what they've always been: dramatic enactments of a creativity inherent in many things that people do. Knowing this, fields like English might extend their reach beyond connoisseurship and critique by welcoming cul tural production more warmly than in times past. When we talk about making po ems, blogs, or videos, the stakes are rather higher than the artifacts: what actually gets made is humanness itself.
Pulling down the wall between the humanities and the arts, we might also dis mantle the one that divides the humanities from the sciences and social disciplines.
Rather than confine ourselves arbitrarily to a body of knowledge that looks smaller every day, we might proceed as though our legitimate concern was the human di mension of every field, from economics to cosmology. 
